

# PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARIANISM AND APOLLINARIANISM

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**A**RIANISM and Apollinarianism are two contrasting heresies of the fourth century. Arianism may be described as a leftist heresy: it denied the divinity of the pre-existent Christ, the Logos; it also denied a divine nature in the born Christ, Jesus. Apollinarianism may be called a rightist heresy: it denied a human nature in the born Christ. Of the various phases of these controversies we have selected for discussion here one single phase, that of their philosophic implications.

Patristic opponents of Arianism as well as Patristic Church historians and heresiographers trace the Arian heresy to Aristotle. Thus Aristotle is mentioned as the source of the teaching of the various Arians by Basil,<sup>1</sup> Gregory of Nyssa,<sup>2</sup> Socrates Scholasticus,<sup>3</sup> and Epiphanius.<sup>4</sup> But when we study the passages in which Aristotle is mentioned as the source of this heresy, we are surprised to discover that the reference is not to any particular theory with which the name of Aristotle is generally associated, such, for instance, as his denial of Platonic ideas, his belief in the eternity of the world, his conception of God as only a prime mover, or his view that the soul is only a form of the body, but only to the Aristotelian method of reasoning. Thus they always speak in this connection of Aristotle's "syllogisms,"<sup>5</sup> or of Aristotle's "dialectics,"<sup>6</sup> or of Aristotle's "systematic treatment of the art of reasoning" (*τεχνολογία*),<sup>7</sup> or of Aristotle's work on the *Categories*.<sup>8</sup> And when we examine these references to the Aristotelian method of reasoning as being the cause of the Arian heresy, we are further surprised to discover that they do not mean reasoning by the Aristotelian method from premises which are also Aristotelian, but rather the application of the Aristotelian method of reasoning to generally accepted Christian premises.

A good example of this is to be found in Socrates, who in his history of the Church tries to show how the Arian Aetius, under the influence of Aristotle's logic, and by his clumsy use of it, framed a fallacious argument against the orthodox Christian belief in the eternal generation of the Son,

<sup>1</sup> *Adversus Eunomium* I, 5 (PG 29, 516B).

<sup>2</sup> *Contra Eunomium* I (PG 45, 261D).

<sup>3</sup> *Historia Ecclesiastica* II, 35 (PG 67, 297).

<sup>4</sup> *Adversus Haereses Panarium* LXIX, 69. (PG 42, 316B).

<sup>5</sup> Basil, *loc. cit.*; Gregory of Nyssa, *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Epiphanius, *loc. cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Gregory of Nyssa, *Cont. Eunom.* VII (PG 45, 741A).

<sup>8</sup> Socrates, *loc. cit.*

and how by the fallaciousness of his argument he proved himself to be “unable to comprehend how there could be an ingenerable generation and how that which is unbegotten can be co-eternal with him that begot.”<sup>9</sup> The expression “ingenerable generation (*ἀγέννητος γέννησις*), the meaning of which Socrates charges Aetius with not having comprehended, is reminiscent of the expression “ingenerably generated” (*ἀγεννητογεννής*) in Alexander of Alexandria.<sup>10</sup> This expression is used by the latter in the same sense as the expression “eternally generated” (*ἀειγεννής*), likewise used by him in the same context, and also in the same sense as the expression “begotten [or generated] of the Father without beginning (*ἀνάρχως*) and eternally (*ἀείδιώς*),” which is used by Athanasius.<sup>11</sup> The argument framed by Aetius may, therefore, have been directed either against the expression “ingenerably generated,” or against the expression “eternally generated [or begotten], or against the expression “generated [or begotten] without beginning.” We are not told, however, by Socrates how the argument was framed by Aetius, nor does he tell us why he branded the argument as fallacious. Let us then try to reconstruct the argument as well as the refutation by which it was shown to be fallacious.

Aetius, we may assume, started with the New Testament description of the preexistent Christ as the “only begotten (*μονογενής*) Son” (John 1:18) and, having in mind the use of the expression “begotten [or generated] without beginning” as the equivalent of the expression “ingenerably generated,” he framed his argument against it in the following syllogistic form:

Everything begotten has a beginning (*ἀρχή*);  
 The son is begotten;  
 Therefore, the Son has a beginning (*ἀρχή*).

The reason why Socrates branded this argument as fallacious was, we may assume, that he discovered in it some fallacy. The fallacy we may further assume, was that of equivocation; for the term “beginning” (*ἀρχή*), he must have known, is used by Aristotle in many senses, of which two are that of “cause” and that of “not-eternal,”<sup>12</sup> and Aetius, he must have noticed, uses the term “beginning” in his syllogism in these two different senses. When, in his proposition in the major premise, he says that “everything begotten has a beginning,” he could have meant only that “everything

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> In Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *Eccles. Hist.* I, 4 (PG 82, 912A); Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer. Panar.* LIXIX, 6 (PG 42, 209D–212A).

<sup>11</sup> *Expositio Fidei* 1 (PG 25, 200–201A).

<sup>12</sup> Cf., for instance, the two uses of the term in *Metaph.* I, 2, 982b, 9, and *Phys.* VI, 5, 236a, 14.

begotten has a cause," for the proposition in the sense of "everything begotten is not-eternal" is yet to be proved. But when, in his conclusion, he says that "therefore, the Son has a beginning," he meant thereby that "therefore, the Son is not-eternal." Socrates' own contention that "that which was begotten can be coëternal with him who begot" is a restatement of the view generally accepted in catholic Christianity, namely, that the Son was eternally generated, which means that, though he was begotten and has a cause, he is still eternal.

Thus it is the syllogistic method of reasoning from generally approved Christian premises that, according to the Fathers, has led to the Arian heresy.

When we study further those passages in which the Fathers trace the Arian heresy to the Aristotelian method of syllogistic reasoning, we note several other things.

First, the Fathers do not mean that only the Arian heresy, and no other, arises from the use of Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning. For we find that Eusebius quotes the non-extant *The Little Labyrinth*, now taken to be the work of Hippolytus, as saying in effect that some other heresies, such as those of Artemus or Artemon and of the Theodotians, were traceable to the fact that they apply syllogistic reasoning to scriptural beliefs.<sup>13</sup>

Second, the Fathers do not mean that only Aristotle, and no other philosopher, is responsible for the Arian heresy. For we find that Gregory of Nyssa himself, who so often blames Aristotle for the rise of Arianism, once at least blames Plato also.<sup>14</sup>

Third, they do not mean that if the Arians had not used the Aristotelian method of syllogism, but had used the Platonic method of division, they would not have arrived at their heretical and fallacious conclusion. For the Platonic method of division, as stated by Aristotle, is nothing but a weak syllogism,<sup>15</sup> its weakness being that, without the use of a middle term, it aims to arrive at the same conclusion as that at which the syllogism tries to arrive with the use of a middle term. So the Platonic method of division would not have prevented the Arians from arriving at the same heretical and fallacious conclusion.

Fourth, the Fathers do not mean that the syllogistic method is entirely fallacious and should never be employed in discussion of matters religious. For we sometimes find that the very same Fathers, such, for instance, as Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, who blame the Aristotelian method of syllo-

<sup>13</sup> Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* V, 28, 13.

<sup>14</sup> *Cont. Eunom.* IX (PG 45, 813C).

<sup>15</sup> *Anal. Pr.* I, 31, 46a, 33.

gistic reasoning for the rise of the Arian heresy, do themselves make use of this kind of reasoning in such investigations as those of the proofs of the existence of God and the creation of the world. In fact, Gregory of Nyssa openly admits that “subtle dialectic possesses a force that may be turned both ways, as well for the overthrow of truth as for the detection of falsehood,”<sup>16</sup> and consequently, though on the whole he prefers “a discussion which is in a naked unsyllogistic form,”<sup>17</sup> still he asks, “With what, then, must we begin, so as to conduct our thinking by logical sequence to the proposed conclusion?”<sup>18</sup> and insists upon following what is philosophically considered to be good, logical reasoning.<sup>19</sup> In this their cautious use of the syllogistic method, the Fathers merely followed the example of Aristotle himself, who constantly warns those who use syllogistic reasoning to use it properly and to guard against certain fallacies, among them the fallacy of equivocation.<sup>20</sup>

From all this we may gather that, by their statements that the Arian heresy arose from the Aristotelian method of syllogistic reasoning, the Fathers did not mean that only the Arian heresy was traceable to the Aristotelian syllogism, nor did they mean that only Aristotle was responsible for the Arian heresy, nor did they mean that the Platonic method of logical division could not have led to the Arian heresy, nor finally did they mean that all syllogistic reasoning was wrong and fallacious. What they meant was that the Arians, like all other heretics, were led astray by their wrong use of philosophy, especially of the Aristotelian method of syllogistic reasoning, which, as indicated by Aristotle’s own warning, easily lends itself to misuse.

This, I believe, is a fair and accurate account of what the Fathers meant when they blamed Aristotle for the heresy of Arianism.

But let us see what has been made out of the Fathers’ statements by some historians. On the basis of these statements they try to make the struggle between Arianism and orthodoxy a battle between Aristotelianism and Platonism. This is how the controversy is presented by Baur.<sup>21</sup> And if we want to find out exactly what was the battle between Aristotelianism and Platonism, upon which the controversy between Arianism and orthodoxy is assumed to be based, we hear a great deal about how Aristotle derives

<sup>16</sup> *De Anima et Resurrectione* (PG 46, 52B).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Oratio Catechetica Magna* 19 (PG 45, 56C).

<sup>19</sup> *Cont. Eunom.* 18 (PG 45, 316D).

<sup>20</sup> *De Sophisticis Elenchus* 4, 165b, 23–166b, 19.

<sup>21</sup> F. Ch. Baur, *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschenwerdung Gottes* I (Tübingen, 1841), pp. 389 ff.

concepts from concrete individual things in an empirical manner, referring always to experience, and how Plato, on the contrary, disregarding concrete things and empirical observation, deals with pure ideas. Out of such and similar contrasts, we are expected to derive all the theological controversies between Arianism and orthodoxy. Milman treats the controversy between Arianism and orthodoxy as a sort of War of the Roses, telling us how Aetius attached himself to the Aristotelian philosophy, and how “with him appears to have begun the long strife between Aristotelianism and Platonism in the Church.”<sup>22</sup> Cardinal Newman, on the ground that Arianism had a “close connexion with the existing Aristotelic school,”<sup>23</sup> sees in it a sort of Oxford Movement in reverse, and, because the Arians had a close connexion with the Aristotelic school, calls them “The School of Sophists.”<sup>24</sup>

But historians, as we know, do not always merely repeat one another; they are sometimes at variance with one another. So, while one school of historians identified Aristotle as the source of infection of the Arian heresy, another school identified Plato as the source of that infection. Chief exponent of this latter view is Ritter,<sup>25</sup> though before him a similar view had been expressed in a milder form by Baumgarten-Crusius.<sup>26</sup> Here is how Ritter finds a connection between Plato and Arius: Representing Arius as having transformed the eternally generated Logos of the orthodox Christians into a created being in order to provide God with an intermediary for the creation of the world, which He himself could not create directly, Ritter suggests that this view of Arius originated in Plato’s *Timaeus*, where the Demiurge, after having created the “heavenly gods,” addresses these traditional deities of mythology and delegates to them the creation of the mortal creatures, which he himself could not create directly.<sup>27</sup>

This representation of the view of Arius, as well as the explanation of its origin, is, to our mind, wrong on several grounds.

First, all that we know of the original teachings of Arius is that he reduced the Logos, who is described in John as he through whom all things were made by God and who in the orthodoxy of his time was considered an eternally generated being, to a created being. Among the reasons reported, in Arius’ name, for his having introduced that change in the origin

<sup>22</sup> H. H. Milman, *History of Christianity* III (London, 1840), p. 43, n.

<sup>23</sup> J. H. Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century* (4th ed., London, 1876), p. 29.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Heinrich Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie* VI (Hamburg, 1841), pp. 21–22.

<sup>26</sup> L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte* I (Jena, 1823), p. 262.

<sup>27</sup> *Timaeus* 40D–41D.

of the Logos there is no mention of the fact that it was out of a desire to provide God with an intermediary for the creation of the world, necessitated by reason of some inability on the part of God to create it directly. The view that the Logos was used as an intermediary in the creation of the world because of some inability on the part of God to create it directly was introduced by Asterius and adopted by Arius after the Logos had already been transformed by them into a created being, and it was introduced only in answer to the question that, if the Logos was created by God *ex nihilo* in the same way as the world, "why then were not all things brought into being by God alone at the same command, at which the Son came into being?"<sup>28</sup>

Second, the Demiurge's address to the traditional gods in the *Timaeus* could not have been the source of Arius' transforming the Logos into a created being, for that address is couched by Plato in mythological language and the traditional gods are represented as "generated" rather than "created." Thus these traditional gods are described as "children (*παιδες*) . . . born (*ἐγενέσθην*)," and in that passage the Demiurge describes himself as "he who begot (*γεννήσας*) this universe" and as "Father."<sup>29</sup> For be it remembered that Arius rejected not only the eternity of the generation of Logos out of the essence of God — the orthodox view of his time — but also the very concept of a generation out of the essence of God, even without its being eternal — the view held previously by the Apologists —, substituting for it a creation out of nothing.

Third, this address of the Demiurge to the traditional deities in the *Timaeus* again could not have been the source of the Arians' explanation for the need of an intermediary in the creation of the world. In the *Timaeus*, the reason why mortal beings had to be created by an intermediary and not directly by the Demiurge was, in the words of the Demiurge himself, as follows: "If through me these came into existence and receive life, they would be equal to gods"<sup>30</sup> and immortal like them. The explanation as quoted in the name of the Arians reads that the created nature "could not participate (*μετασχεῖν*) in the unmixed (*ἀκράτον*) hand of the Father and in His workmanship"<sup>31</sup> or that "the other creatures could not endure (*βαστάξαι*) the work of the unmixed hand of the Ingenerate."<sup>32</sup> Neither in phraseology nor in content is there any similarity between the statement in

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Athanasius, *Orationes contra Arianos* II, 24 (PG, 26, 200A); "This they not only have said, but they have dare to put in writing, namely, Eusebius, Arius, and Asterius who sacrificed"; *De Decretis* 8 (PG, 25, 437A): "This is what Asterius the Sacrificer has written, and Arius has transcribed and bequeathed to his friends."

<sup>29</sup> *Timaeus* 40E–41A.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* 41C.

<sup>31</sup> *Orat. cont. Arian.* II, 24 (PG 26, 200A).

<sup>32</sup> *De Decretis* 8 (PG 25, 437A).

the *Timaeus* and the Arian statements. With regard to phraseology, what is striking in the Arian statements is the expression which literally means “to participate in the . . . hand” and “to endure the . . . hand,” and the description of the term “hand” by a term which literally means “unmixed.” No suggestion of this phraseology is to be found in the statement in the *Timaeus*. With regard to content, the explanation implied in the Arian statements is that there was a certain unfitness or impropriety for the created natures, which are not unmixed or pure, to be, figuratively speaking, touched by the unmixed or pure hand of God, whereas the explanation given in the *Timaeus* is that the Demiurge did not want the created beings to be immortal like himself.

There is, however, a resemblance, both in phraseology and in content, between these Arian statements and a statement by Philo, in which the latter tries to explain why God had chosen to use ideas or powers or instruments in the creation or, rather, according to my own interpretation of the statement, in the preservation of the world.<sup>33</sup> The Philonic statement reads as follows: “When out of that [shapeless and qualityless matter] God produced all things, He did so without touching (*έφαπτόμενος*) it himself, since it was not lawful for His nature, happy and blessed as it was, to touch (*ψαύειν*) indefinite and mixed up (*πεφυρμένης*) matter, but instead He made full use of the incorporeal powers, well denoted by their name of ideas, to enable each genus to take its appropriate shape.”<sup>34</sup>

The resemblance between Philo’s not “to touch” and the Arians’ not “to participate in the . . . hand” or not “to endure . . . the hand” is quite obvious. Moreover, in the light of this passage of Philo, it may be suggested that the term *βαστάξαι* in the second quotation from Athanasius, which is usually translated by “endure” (Latin: *ferre*), was used in the sense of “touch,” which is one of the common senses of that verb. Perhaps also the term *μετασχεῖν* in the first quotation from Athanasius, which usually means “participate in,” was also used in the sense of “to touch,” even though no such use of the term is recorded in lexicons, for if the term *προσέχειν* is sometimes used in the sense of “to touch,” why should not also the term *μετασχεῖν*? There is, too, a resemblance between the statement that it would be unfit and improper for the impure created natures to be touched by the pure hand of God, which is implied in the Arian passages, and the statement that it would be unlawful that God should touch impure matter, which is explicitly expressed in the Philonic passage. Both these statements, that of Philo directly and that of the Arians indirectly, through Philo, reflect the

<sup>33</sup> Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), pp. 274 ff.

<sup>34</sup> *De Specialibus Legibus I*, 60, 329.

many passages in the Old Testament that make it unlawful for the clean and the holy to touch the unclean and for the unclean to touch the clean and the holy.<sup>35</sup>

As for the meaning of these statements about the unfitness or impropriety or unlawfulness that God should do certain things, we have shown how Philo, with his known conception of God as a free agent and as all-powerful, for whom nothing is impossible, could not have meant by his term "unlawful" that God was unable to create the world directly, and how he could only have meant that God, who to him was not only the creator of the world, but the pedagogue of mankind, by not touching gross matter, wished to set an example before men and to teach them not to defile themselves by anything gross and unclean.<sup>36</sup> This, also, we may assume, is the meaning of the Arian statements.

There are some historians who, indeed, object to these methods of treating the controversy between Arianism and orthodoxy as having its origin in Aristotle or Plato. Thus Dorner objects to aligning Arians and their opponents as Aristotelians against strict Platonists, He does so, he says, only on the ground that "amongst the teachers of the Church also there were some who received an Aristotelian training." He admits, however, that "the Arians were trained in the Aristotelian dialectic," and that, "on the ground of the empirical feature common to both [Aristotelianism and Arianism], he recognizes a relationship between them."<sup>37</sup> Hefele, without discussing whether Arianism had its origin in Aristotle or in Plato, volunteers the opinion that "Philonism . . . seems to have exercised some influence over the development of Arianism," but the Philonic influence which he finds in Arianism is the same as that which Ritter discovered in Plato's *Timaeus*, for he represents Philo as having an exaggerated notion of "the distinction between God and the world," and as considering "the supreme God much too sublime to enter into direct relation with the world and the world . . . too low to bear any direct action of God" and as having, therefore, introduced the Logos for the purpose of serving, "like the created gods of Plato," as an intermediary in the creation of the world.<sup>38</sup>

On the whole, it is not historically correct to arrange the Fathers into groups, to dress them in the uniform of the Academy or Lyceum or the Porch, to make them march under the banner of Plato or of Aristotle or of

<sup>35</sup> Cf. *Philo* I, pp. 280-281.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 280-286, 271-274; II, p. 128.

<sup>37</sup> I. A. Dorner, *The Person of Christ* I, 2 (Edinburgh, 1859), note 50, pp. 499-500; (German, I [Stuttgart, 1845], 859). Cf. Heinrich Voigt, *Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien* (Bremen-Leipzig, 1861), p. 193, n.

<sup>38</sup> K. J. von Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, § 19.

the Stoics and sing the songs of those schools. The Fathers did not regard themselves as followers of the various schools of Greek thought. They did not think in terms of contrasts between the different systems within philosophy; they thought only in terms of a contrast between Scripture and philosophy. Within philosophy itself there were to them only right doctrines, which were in agreement with Scripture, and wrong doctrines, which were in disagreement with Scripture, though on certain doctrines they found some philosophers were more often in agreement with Scripture than others. In battling with each other, the Fathers did not battle as partisans of certain opposing schools of Greek philosophy; they battled only as advocates of opposing interpretations of Scripture. Their opposing interpretations of Scripture, however, were sometimes influenced by philosophic considerations or supported by philosophic arguments, and in this way, therefore, it happens that the Fathers are found occasionally to have aligned themselves with certain philosophic attitudes on certain particular problems. In the case of the Arian controversy, the difference of opinion, in so far as it indirectly reflects philosophic considerations, reflects not the controversy between Plato and Aristotle, but a difference in the interpretation of the Platonic theory of ideas. Directly and primarily it is a difference in the interpretation of texts in the New Testament.<sup>39</sup>

The main New Testament texts involved in this controversy are the opening verses in the Gospel According to John, "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God . . . All things were made through him."<sup>40</sup> It is not necessary for us to re-open here the discussion of whether or not John follows Philo, or of whether or not he understood Philo properly, or of whether or not, if he understood him properly, he deliberately differed with him. Suffice it to say that beginning with the Apologists, in the middle of the second century, the Fathers began to fill out the skeleton-like outline of the Logos as found in the Prologue of John with details borrowed from the writings of Philo.

Two main points characterize this interpretation. First, the Logos, as in Philo, became the place of an intelligible world, consisting of ideas and constituting a plan by which the world was created, and, accordingly, John's statement that "all things were made through him" assumed that meaning or that additional meaning. In the New Testament itself there is no indication that the Logos or the pre-existent Christ, which is meant by the

<sup>39</sup> Certain parts of the discussion which follows have been dealt with by me more fully in *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), to which references will be occasionally made in the footnotes.

<sup>40</sup> John I:1-3.

Logos, reflected, even remotely, the Platonic ideas. Second, the Logos had two stages of existence, first from eternity as a thought of God; then beginning with the creation of the world, and prior to it, prior, of course, not in a temporal sense, as a real personal being existing with God and by the side of God, as it were. This twofold-stage theory may be considered as an attempt on the part of Philo to harmonize in Plato those statements where the ideas are spoken of as eternal with those where the ideas are spoken of as having been made by God.

But, while following Philo on these two points, the Fathers from the very beginning differed with him on two other points. First, the Logos to them came into being not, as in Philo, by an act of creation out of nothing, but rather by a process of generation out of the essence of God. He was begotten, not made or created. Second, the Logos was not, as in Philo, merely divine, but he was God, equal with God in divinity. This latter belief followed as a corollary from the conception of the Logos as begotten of God, and is based on the philosophical principle that in natural generation the progeny is of the same species as the begetter, which is expressed by Aristotle in his statement that "man begets man."<sup>41</sup> This explanation, which may already have been in the mind of the philosophically trained Apologists, is explicitly advanced later by Augustine in a passage where, arguing against the Arian Maximinus in support of the traditional belief in the divinity of the Logos, he quotes Aristotle's statement that "man begets man," adding thereto his own words, "and dog dog."<sup>42</sup> But these Apologists, though they all believed in the twofold-stage theory of the Logos, still differed among themselves as to the interpretation of John's words, "In the beginning was the Logos . . . and the Logos was with God." Some took it to refer to the first stage of existence, and interpreted the verse to mean that from eternity the Logos was in the thought of God and then was generated and hence was with God. Others interpreted it to mean that in the beginning, when God was about to create heaven and earth, the Logos came into being and was with God. Incidentally, it means that in this latter interpretation the Greek term *ἦν* in John was taken not in the sense of "was," but rather in the sense of "became" (*ἐγένετο*) or "came to be," a sense which could be justified as a Hebraized term.<sup>43</sup> In the Septuagint the Greek word "to be" (*εἰναι*) also means "to become," "to be made" (*fieri*).

This conception of the Logos was held consistently and uniformly by all the Fathers until Irenaeus and Origen. Those two Fathers rejected the two-

<sup>41</sup> *Metaph.* VII, 7, 1032a, 23–24; cf. IX, 8, 1049b, 27–29.

<sup>42</sup> *Contra Maximinum Arianum* II, 6.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* I, pp. 197–198.

fold stage theory and substituted for it a single-stage theory. The Logos was eternally generated by God. Irenaeus introduced it out of pure opposition to the Gnostics. Origen introduced it on philosophic grounds. It happened that Origen was a disciple of Ammonius Saccas, whose teachings we may presume are those we find in the work of another of his disciples, Plotinus. Now Ammonius was born a Christian. We may therefore assume that originally, like all Christians of his time, he followed Philo's interpretation of Platonic ideas, and believed in a twofold-stage theory. Then, when he gave up Christianity, he abandoned the twofold-stage theory of the Logos as well as the use of the term Logos, substituting for it the conception of an eternally generated Nous. Neoplatonism, as we find it in the *Enneads*, is thus to be regarded as a paganized version of Philonic philosophy. As in this new version of Philonism, Nous, which takes the place of the Logos in Philo, was eternally generated from God, the Logos, which, being a Christian term, was retained by Origen, was made by him eternally generated from God, for an eternally generated Logos appealed to him as being more compatible with the Christian conception of the Logos as God. The transition from the Apologists to Origen in Christianity thus corresponds to the transition from the Philonic to the Plotinian interpretation of Plato in the general history of philosophy. But though Irenaeus and Origen had introduced the single-stage theory, certain Fathers still continued to believe for some time in the twofold-stage theory. In the fourth century these two theories still existed side by side.

This is the status of the doctrine of the Trinity, among the orthodox Fathers by the time of Arius. Two theories, the single-stage and twofold-stage theories, existed side by side. Both recognized the principle of generation. To both theories the Logos was generated out of the essence of God, though to only the single-stage theory was it eternally generated, and to both theories the Logos was God.

It is here that Arius comes in with his new view. The starting point is his adoption of Philo's twofold-stage theory of the Logos. The manner in which he expresses himself in favor of the twofold-stage theory is strongly reminiscent of the language of Philo and the Apologists. He begins by saying: "God was alone (*μόνος*), and the Word as yet was not."<sup>44</sup> This reflects two sources. First, it reflects Philo's comment upon the verse, "It is not good that man should be alone,"<sup>45</sup> as meaning that it is good that God should be alone, thus establishing the principle of the unity of God.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* I, 5 (PG 26, 21A).

<sup>45</sup> Gen. 2:18.

<sup>46</sup> *Legum Allegoria* II, I, 1-2.

Second, it reflects Hippolytus' further interpretation of the same verse as meaning that, before the generation of the Logos, God was alone, thus establishing the twofold-stage theory.<sup>47</sup>

Then Arius continues: "When wishing ( $\thetaελήσας$ ) to create ( $\deltaημιουργῆσαι$ ) us, He made a certain one, and named him Word and Wisdom and Son, that he might form us by means of Him."<sup>48</sup> This reflects Philo's statement that "When God willed ( $\betaονληθεὶς$ ) to create this visible world, he first modelled ( $προεξτύπον$ ) the intelligible world,"<sup>49</sup> which has "no other place than the divine Logos,"<sup>50</sup> and by the Logos he created the world. The Logos thus to Arius, as to Philo, entered upon its second stage of existence.

These two stages of existence are described by Arius as two Wisdoms or Logoi. The Logos or Wisdom of the first stage is further described by him as "a property ( $iδίαν$ ) coexistent with God;" the Logos or Wisdom in the second stage is described by him primarily as "the Son" and is said to be named "Wisdom and Logos" only because of its participation in the Wisdom or the Logos of the first stage.<sup>51</sup> This corresponds exactly to the Philonic view, according to which the Logos, and the powers or ideas it contains, is, in its first stage, only a property of God, and becomes a real being, called "the first-born Son of God," only upon its entrance into its second stage.<sup>52</sup> Then, of course, following both Philo and John, who described the Logos as an instrument by which God created the world, Arius says that "the Unoriginate made the Son an origin of the things generated."<sup>53</sup>

The terms used by Arius as a description of the Logos' coming into existence are, as quoted by Athanasius from his *Thalia*, various forms of the term  $γίνομαι$ , "to become," "to be born," and  $ποιέω$ , "to make."<sup>54</sup> Arius himself in his letter to Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, describes his conception of the Son's coming into existence indiscriminately by such terms as "he was begotten ( $γεννηθή$ ), or created ( $κτισθή$ ), or singled out ( $όρισθή$ ), or established ( $θεμελιωθή$ )."<sup>55</sup> And the Logos himself, because he is he through whom all things were made, is described by Arius as "under-worker ( $ὑπονργός$ ) and assistant ( $βοηθός$ ),"<sup>56</sup> or as "co-worker ( $συνεργός$ ) or under-

<sup>47</sup> *Contra Haeresim Noeti* 10.

<sup>48</sup> Athanasius, *loc. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> *De Opificio Mundi* 2, 16.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 5, 20.

<sup>51</sup> Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* I, 5 (PG 26, 21A,B).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Wolfson, *Philo* I, pp. 231, 234; II, pp. 126 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Athanasius, *De Synodis* 15 (PG 26, 705D).

<sup>54</sup> Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* I. 5.

<sup>55</sup> Theodoret, *Hist. Eccl.* I, 4 (PG 82, 912B); ed. L. Parmentier: I, 5, 4.

<sup>56</sup> *De Decretis* 8 (PG, 25, 437A).

worker.”<sup>57</sup> This reflects Philo’s use of the term *συνεργοί*, “co-workers,” as a description of the powers, contained in the Logos, in their capacity of agents commissioned by God to create the body and the irrational soul of man.<sup>58</sup>

In the description of Arianism so far there is nothing with which fault could be found on the ground of orthodoxy. By itself the twofold-stage theory of the Logos, which was adopted by Arius, would not have been regarded by his contemporaries as heretical. The Apologists held the twofold-stage theory and were never attacked for it.<sup>59</sup> Zeno of Verona, toward the end of the fourth century, reasserted the twofold-stage theory, without ever being declared unorthodox.<sup>60</sup> In fact, while the twofold-stage theory somehow disappeared, it was never anathematized.<sup>61</sup> Neither would Arius’ failure to use the term “generated” or “begotten” exclusively as a description of the Logos’ coming into existence have been, by itself, heretical, for the orthodox Fathers, too, at that time had not used the term “generated” or “begotten” exclusively.<sup>62</sup> Nor, again, was there in Arius’ statement that, when God was alone, “the Word as yet was not,” if taken by itself, anything that could have aroused opposition, for a similar statement was made also by Tertullian,<sup>63</sup> and it aroused no opposition.

Similarly Arius’ use of the term *ὑπουργός*, “under-worker,” or *βοηθός*, “assistant,” or *συνεργός*, “co-worker,” as a description of the Logos, would not by itself have been considered by his contemporaries as heretical. The term *ὑπουργός* has been used by Theophilus as a description of the Logos,<sup>64</sup> without causing any damage to his reputation. Then there is a term similar to those three terms used by Arius, namely, the term *σύμβούλος*, “counselor,” which was used by both Theophilus<sup>65</sup> and Clement of Alexandria,<sup>66</sup> without, again, causing any damage to their reputations. Even Athanasius himself, who attacks the Arians for the use of these terms,<sup>67</sup> describes the Logos as a “living counsel (*ζῶσα βούλη*)”,<sup>68</sup> though it would seem to be in direct opposition to the verse, “For who hath known the mind of the Lord,

<sup>57</sup> Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* II, 29 (PG, 26, 208B).

<sup>58</sup> *De Opificio Mundi* 24, 75; *De Confusione Linguarum* 35, 179; *De Fuga* 13, 68–70, cf. *Philo* I, pp. 269–270, 272–274.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* I, pp. 192–198.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 197.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 217–219.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 252–253.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 195, 217, 586, n. 53.

<sup>64</sup> *Ad. Autol.* II, 10.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* II, 22.

<sup>66</sup> *Strom.* VII, 2<sup>7</sup> (PG 9, 412A).

<sup>67</sup> Cf. *De Decretis* 8; *Orat. cont. Arian.* II, 29.

<sup>68</sup> *Orat. cont. Arian.* II, 64 (PG 26, 457B).

or who hath been his counsellor?"<sup>69</sup> But, as we have suggested,<sup>70</sup> the Logos or the pre-existent Christ was called "co-worker" or "under-worker" or "assistant" or "counsellor" or "counsel" not in the sense that God was in need of his help or counsel, but in the sense that he was initiated in the knowledge of God and was called by God to cooperate with Him in His work of creation. Philo himself, who describes the powers as "co-workers," found in his use of this term no opposition to his statement that God created the world "without any helper (*παράκλητος*)."<sup>71</sup>

It is, therefore, not his adoption of the twofold-stage theory, nor his use of the term "created" by the side of the term "generated," nor his use of the expression "the Word as yet was not," nor his description of the Logos as "under-worker" or "assistant" or "co-worker," but rather what he meant by all this, that has brought about his anathematization. What he meant by all this is quite explicitly expressed by him in his statement that the Logos came into existence "out of things that were not (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*)."<sup>72</sup> This was the gravamen of his theory: the Logos was not generated from the essence of God, but was created *ex nihilo*. As a corollary of this view, the Son or Logos was no longer God; he was only divine. This is what roused opposition. And the opposition expressed itself in the statements in the Nicene creed that maintain that the pre-existent Christ was "begotten (*γεννηθέντα*) of the Father"; "of the substance (*οὐσίας*) of the Father"; "begotten (*γεννηθέντα*), not made (*ποιηθέντα*)."<sup>73</sup> It also expresses itself in the anathematism of those who say "Before He was begotten (*γεννηθῆναι*) He was not" and "He came into existence (*έγένετο*) out of things that were not (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*)."<sup>74</sup> Note the indiscriminate use of the terms *γεννηθῆναι* and *έγένετο*, by which it describes the view of those who say that the Son was created out of nothing. Note also that, in its positive statement, the Creed insists only that the generation was out of the essence of God; it does not insist, that is to say, openly, that the generation itself was an eternal process. There is no anathema here, as there never was afterwards, of the twofold-stage theory of the Apologists, though the conception of eternal generation was tacitly adopted as the general Christian view.<sup>75</sup>

But what was the motive behind this Arian adoption of the Philonic conception of the Logos?

Primarily it was a religious motive. It was an attempt to preserve two principles which Arius thought were fundamental to Christianity.

<sup>69</sup> Rom. 11:34, quoting Isa. 40:13 (LXX).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers I*, p. 193, n. 12.

<sup>71</sup> *De Opificio Mundi* 6, 23.

<sup>72</sup> Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* I, 5 (PG 26, 21A).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers I*, pp. 217-218.

First, it was the principle of the unity of God in its absolute sense as defined by Philo on behalf of Judaism. This principle of the unity of God, as proclaimed in the Old Testament in the verse, "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one," is reaffirmed by Jesus, when he said that it constituted the first of all commandments.<sup>74</sup> It is reaffirmed also by Paul in his oft-repeated statements that "there is no God but one."<sup>75</sup> Now in the Old Testament the unity of God means only an external, numerical unity. It is in opposition to polytheism. There is no speculation there about what philosophers would call internal unity, logical or metaphysical unity. But Philo extended and deepened the scriptural meaning of the unity of God; it was to exclude any kind of logical or metaphysical divisibility, such as divisibility into two substances, even when inseparable from each other, or divisibility into matter and form, or divisibility into genus and species. The unity of God meant absolute unity.

Christianity rejected this Philonic conception of the unity of God. God indeed is one, but one only in an external or numerical unity. Internally God consisted of three inseparable individual substances, called hypostases or persons. And the philosophers among the Fathers tried to justify this interpretation of the unity of God on philosophic grounds. The entire problem of the Trinity was a search to find a philosophic interpretation of this relative conception of the unity of God. Arius, like many other Christians before him, was dissatisfied with this revised conception of the unity of God. He, therefore, readopted the Philonic conception.

This is the first religious principle which led him to his heresy.

The second religious principle is the Old Testamental, as well as the post-biblical, Jewish conception of God in his relation to the world, and the fulness thereof, as an artisan and not as a begetter. Early Semitic mythology, like Greek mythology and all other mythologies, conceived of God as begetter, bringing other gods and men, and the world as a whole, into existence after the manner of animal procreation. Traces of this mythological conception of God as begetter have survived in the Hebrew Scripture. But the entire history of the religion of Israel as depicted in Scripture itself is an attempt to eradicate all mythological conceptions of God. God is a creator of things; He is not a begetter of things. The few references in the Old Testament to angels as "the sons of God"<sup>76</sup> may be survivals of this old Semitic mythology. But in the Old Testament they came to be used in the

<sup>74</sup> Mark 12:19.

<sup>75</sup> I Cor. 8:4; cf. 8:5; Eph. 4:3-6.

<sup>76</sup> Gen. 6:2,4; Job 1:6, 38:7; Dan. 3:25 (Son of God).

sense of “heavenly” or “unearthly” or “supernal” beings, and in post-biblical Jewish literature, Apocalyptic as well as rabbinic, angels are explicitly described as created by God, like anything else. And in Philo the Logos, ideas, intelligible world, and powers are all described as made and created, not begotten by God.

Christianity restored the conception of God as begetter. This is emphasized with great clearness by every one of the Fathers, beginning with Justin. One of the Fathers, Theophilus, even uses the expression “within His own bowels”<sup>77</sup> as a description of the Logos before its generation.

What Arius did was to return to the original Scriptural and post-Scriptural Jewish conception of God as artisan.

But there is also a philosophic aspect to the problem. This controversy between Arianism and catholic Christianity as to whether God is an artisan or a begetter has its parallel in two contrasting conceptions of God in Greek philosophy. The four theistic systems in Greek philosophy, the Platonic, the Aristotelian, the Stoic, and the Neoplatonic, fall into two groups. The Platonic and Aristotelian theism is anti-mythological, considering God as artisan, for Plato, whenever he expresses himself in his own language, speaks of God as handicraftsman (*δημιουργός*),<sup>78</sup> as a maker (*ποιητής*),<sup>79</sup> or as a maker of something natural (*φυτούργός*),<sup>80</sup> and Aristotle speaks of God only as the cause of the motion of the world.<sup>81</sup> The Stoic and the Neoplatonic theism is mythological, that is to say, a rationalization of mythology, conceiving of God as a begetter. Philosophically, therefore, the Arian theism is of the Platonico-Aristotelian type, whereas the orthodox theism is of the Stoico-Neoplatonic type.

This is as much as we have to say on the pre-existent Christ or Logos of Arius.

Let us now take up the Christology of Arius.

With his denial of the divinity of the Logos, it was only logical for Arius to deny that in Jesus there was a divine nature beside a human nature. The Logos, indeed, was made or became flesh, and this being made or becoming flesh is the incarnation of the Logos in the man Jesus, but since the Logos was not God there was no divine nature in Jesus. We should, therefore, expect him to say that Jesus was “a man” or “a mere man” or “a man akin to all” or “an ordinary man” — descriptions used by Theodotus of Byzantium

<sup>77</sup> Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* II, 10.

<sup>78</sup> *Timaeus* 41A.

<sup>79</sup> *Rep.* X, 597D.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Phys.* VIII, 1. 252b, 5–6; 4, 256a, 2–3; *Metaph.* XII, 7.

tium<sup>82</sup> and Paul of Samosata<sup>83</sup> in expressing their denial of the divinity of the born Christ. No such descriptions, however, are reported in the name of Arius. But a description similar to these is attributed to him and to one of his followers. The so-called "Easterns" in their criticism of Cyril of Alexandria refer to Arius and Eunomius as believing in "one nature,"<sup>84</sup> that is to say, as believing that in Jesus there was only a human nature, which is the same as believing that Jesus was a mere man.

Now the expression "one nature," which the Arians themselves did not use, but could have used, was actually used by the Apollinarians, though in a different sense, for, while to Arius the one nature was the human nature, to Apollinaris the one nature was the divine nature. And so this difference between Arius and Apollinaris may serve us here as a point of transition from our discussion of Arianism to a discussion of Apollinarianism.

In his conception of the preexistent Christ, Apollinaris is orthodox and shares with orthodoxy in the opposition to Arianism. The Logos is generated and not created; and it is eternally generated, and is equal with God the Father in divinity. But in his Christology, in his conception of the born Christ, he is opposed to orthodoxy. As against orthodoxy, he maintains, like Arianism, that Jesus had only one nature; not two natures. But then, against Arianism, he maintains that that one nature was a divine nature.

The origin of his denial of a human nature to Jesus, as explained by Apollinaris himself, is based upon his own application of rational investigation or logical reasoning to what he considered fundamental Christian principals — the very same method which, as may be recalled, the Arians have been accused of using and of having been led thereby into heresy. The old traditional view of two natures in Jesus, which he was combating, was regarded by him as being based only on faith, and, like all doctrines which are based only on faith, he maintains, must be examined by reason to see whether it is consistent with fundamental Christian principles, for there is always the danger that certain matters of faith, which are accepted without examination, have been adulterated by heathenish or Jewish opinions.<sup>85</sup> The fundamental Christian principles with which, according to him, one is to start his investigation in the doctrine of the person of Christ, and from which one is to derive, by the method of logical reasoning, a true

<sup>82</sup> Hippolytus, *Refutatio Oninum Haeresium* VII, 35, 2; X, 23, 1; Philaster, *Liber de Haeresibus* L.

<sup>83</sup> Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* V, 27, 2; Theodore of Raythu, *De Incarnatione* (PG 91, 1485D).

<sup>84</sup> *Apologeticus pro XII Capitibus contra Orientales* IV, (PG 76, 333B).

<sup>85</sup> Gregory of Nyssa, *Adversus Apollinarem, Antirrheticus* 4 (PG 45, 1130C). Cf. A. Neander, *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche* II, 2 (Hamburg, 1829), pp. 912–915 (Eng. tr., 12th Am. ed., II, pp. 484–486).

and valid conclusion are two: first, God alone can be a savior; second, Jesus was sent down to be a savior. Both these principles he undoubtedly assumed to be genuinely Christian principles, without any mixture of false heathenish opinion or of wrong contemporary Jewish opinion. In support of the principle that only God can be a savior, he would undoubtedly have pointed to a combination of such Old Testament verses as, "A just God and a savior; there is none beside me,"<sup>86</sup> and "I am the Lord thy God . . . and beside me there is no savior,"<sup>87</sup> and such New Testament verses as, "My spirit hath rejoiced in God my savior,"<sup>88</sup> "By the commandment of God our savior,"<sup>89</sup> "The living God, who is the savior of all men,"<sup>90</sup> and "To the only wise God our savior."<sup>91</sup> In support of the principle that Jesus was sent down as savior he would have pointed to the many New Testament verses where Jesus is spoken of as savior, such as, for instance, "For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Savior, which is Christ the Lord";<sup>92</sup> "For we know that this is indeed the Savior of the world."<sup>93</sup>

The rational investigation or logical method of reasoning by which he seeks to establish on the basis of these two Christian principles that Jesus has only one nature, the same as the nature of God, may be set down in the form of a syllogism as follows:

None is a savior but who is God;  
Jesus is a savior;  
Therefore, Jesus is God.

And so Apollinaris came to describe Jesus as having only "one nature," a divine nature.

Besides the expression "one nature," which is used by both Arius and Apollinaris, though in different senses, there is another view which they share. Both of them deny that Jesus had a rational soul, but, more than that, both of them started also with a denial that Jesus had an irrational soul, then changed their minds and endowed him with an irrational soul, denying him only a rational soul. The question before us, therefore, is two-fold: First, why did they deny Jesus a rational soul? Second, why did they first deny him also an irrational soul and then change their minds about it?

Various explanations have been given, both on behalf of the Arians and on behalf of the Apollinarians, for their denial of a rational soul to Jesus.

<sup>86</sup> Isa. 45:21.

<sup>87</sup> Hos. 13:4.

<sup>88</sup> Luke 1:47.

<sup>89</sup> 1 Tim. 1:1; cf. 2:3; Tit. 1:3, 2:10, 3:4.

<sup>90</sup> 1 Tim. 4:10.

<sup>91</sup> Jude 25.

<sup>92</sup> Luke 2:11.

<sup>93</sup> John 4:42.

We shall forgo a discussion of any of these explanations, and shall try to suggest, on behalf of the Arians as well as on behalf of the Apollinarians, explanations which involve certain philosophic considerations.

On behalf of the Arians, we suggest that their denial of a rational soul in Jesus was a logical consequence of their adoption of the Philonic conception of the Logos as a being created by God, and hence as not being God.

In Philo, the pre-existent Logos is a sort of incorporeal rational soul like the Holy Spirit,<sup>94</sup> and it is sometimes called by him "the mind above us," just as the human rational soul is called by him "the mind within us."<sup>95</sup> But, unlike the Holy Spirit, which, according to Philo, occasionally enters the body of man as in the case of the prophet during his prophetic experience,<sup>96</sup> the Logos, according to him, never enters the body of man, though it enters the body of the physical world as a whole as an immanent Logos, corresponding to what Plato and the Stoics call the soul or mind of the world, terms which Philo never applies to his immanent Logos.<sup>97</sup> But, while the Logos itself does not enter the body of man, it is represented in the body of man by its copy, namely, the rational soul in man; for the rational soul in man, or the human mind, is a copy of the idea of the mind contained in the Logos or, as Philo sometimes says, a copy of the Logos; wherefore, in contrast to "the archetypal Logos above us," he describes the rational soul as "the copy of it which we possess."<sup>98</sup>

But Arius, though he accepted the Philonic conception of the pre-existent Logos and also the Philonic conception of the rational soul in man as being a copy of the Logos, still clung to the Christian conception of the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus. Thus, the Logos itself, according to Arius, entered into the body of Jesus, just as according to Philo, it entered into the body of the world; so, since the Logos itself was in the body of Jesus, there was no need for its copy, the rational soul, to be there. The position of the Logos in Jesus, according to Arius, is analogous to the position of the Holy Spirit in the prophet, according to Philo. To Philo, the Holy Spirit in the prophet takes the place of the rational soul;<sup>99</sup> to Arius, the Logos in Jesus similarly takes the place of the rational soul.

On behalf of Apollinaris, we suggest that his denial of a rational soul in Jesus is due to what he himself would describe as the application of logical reasoning to what he believed to be a fundamental Christian principle. The

<sup>94</sup> Cf. *Philo* II, pp. 31–32, 45–46.

<sup>95</sup> *Heres.* 48, 236.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *Philo* II, pp. 32–33.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ibid.* I, pp. 325–332.

<sup>98</sup> *Heres.* 48, 230 and 233.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *Philo* II, pp. 28–30.

fundamental Christian principle with which he started was the belief, which he has already established to his own satisfaction, that in Jesus there was no human nature; there was in him only one nature, a divine nature. The logical reasoning which he applied to this fundamental Christian principle started with another principle, which he again considered fundamentally Christian, namely, that the rational soul of every human being, like the rational soul of Adam, is created by God and is breathed by God, like a "breath of life," into every human being, who, like Adam, is in his body "dust of the ground," and it is this combination of the "dust of the ground" and the rational soul, called "breath of life," that constitutes the human nature in man, which is called in Scripture "a living soul";<sup>100</sup> all of which means that anybody without a human nature is without a rational soul. Combining these two principles, considered by him to be fundamental Christian principles, he reasoned logically as follows:

All those who are without a human nature  
are without a rational soul;  
Jesus is without a human nature;  
Therefore, Jesus is without a rational soul.

This is how we may explain on behalf of both Arius and Apollinaris why they denied a rational soul in Jesus.

No explanation, however, has so far been given, on behalf of either Arius or Apollinaris, as to why each changed his mind by first denying in Jesus both an irrational and rational soul and then denying in him only a rational soul, and it seems strange that such a change should have taken place in the minds of both of them. Had they any reason for first denying to Jesus an irrational soul and then granting him one? Or are we to assume that they had no reason for their change of mind, but acted only as if they were shopping for a Christmas present for the holy child Jesus, and, after debating with themselves whether or not he could use an irrational soul, for no reason at all first decided he could get along without one, then bethought themselves further and decided to get him one anyhow? But no student of the history of Christianity, to our mind, should assume that those who were engaged in the formulation of its doctrines — especially the Fathers of the Church — ever said anything without good reason; consequently, when no reason for what they happened to say is furnished by the Fathers themselves, we must try to see whether we cannot discover one.

In the matter before us, we may suggest, the reason is to be found in the philosophic problem whether the irrational faculties in man have their origin in an irrational soul, which is corporeal in its essence and inseparable

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Gen. 2:7.

from the human body, or whether they emerge out of the rational, incorporeal, and separable soul in the course of its degeneration as a result of its union with the body. I shall not here go into the history of the problem, which I discuss fully in the as yet unpublished Volume II of *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*. Suffice it to say here that the problem was one of which the Fathers were conscious, and which was debated by them. Now if we assume that there is an irrational soul, apart from the rational soul, one that is inseparable from the body, then, of course, even if it be assumed that Jesus had no rational soul, he would still have an irrational soul. On the other hand, if we assume that there is no irrational soul apart from a soul which is rational, then, with the denial of a rational soul in Jesus, there would also be a denial of an irrational soul in him. The debate which both Arius and Apollinaris seem to have had with themselves as to whether or not Jesus had an irrational soul, and their change of mind from a denial to an affirmation of an irrational soul in him, was therefore a vacillation between two philosophic positions on the question of the nature of the irrational soul. Thus their change of mind was really a change from one philosophic position to another. Philosophers, as we know, have a right to vacillate and to change their minds.

There is one more topic which I should like to discuss in connection with Apollinaris. By his denial to Jesus of a rational soul, which constitutes the human nature, Apollinaris concluded that Jesus had no human nature. Thus we should expect that by his ultimate decision to endow Jesus with an irrational soul, which constitutes the animal nature, he would endow him with an animal nature. The question may therefore be raised whether by denying in Jesus a human nature he meant also to deny in him an animal nature, which is part of the human nature, or whether he meant thereby to deny in him only a human nature, and not an animal nature. The question is not discussed by Apollinaris directly and, as far as I know, it has never been raised by students of Apollinarianism. But in at least nine passages in the fragments of his writings, Apollinaris happens to deal with the irrationally animate body of Jesus. In two of these passages he seems purposely to avoid ascribing to the irrationally animate body of Jesus a "nature." In one passage, however, he does ascribe to it a "nature," and in another an "ousia" which has the same meaning as "nature." But this is offset by still another passage, where he says that it has "not a proper nature" and "not a nature by itself." What he does quite clearly ascribe to the irrationally animate body of Jesus is a "quality" or "property."<sup>101</sup> The general conclusion one may derive from these passages is that, while the

<sup>101</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* I, pp. 440-441.

irrationally animate body of Jesus has no “nature,” it has a “quality” or “property.”

What is the basis of this distinction between “nature” and “quality” or “property”? The basis, I think, is again to be found in ancient Greek philosophy, or rather in ancient Greek chemistry — a science drawn upon by all the Fathers in their discussion of the Incarnation.<sup>102</sup>

In ancient Greek philosophy or chemistry the following question is raised. What happens when two or more things, whether solids or liquids or gases, are combined? Aristotle, the Stoics, and Alexander Aphrodisiensis discuss this question. We shall use here only Aristotle, who says that it all depends upon the nature of the combination. Sometimes the combination is only a composition (*σύνθεσις*), in which the component parts remain unchanged. Sometimes it is a mixture (*μίξις, κράτσις*), in which the resultant is a tertium quid, something new, unlike either one of the constituent parts; but these constituent parts are not destroyed: the resultant is resolvable into them. The Stoics add another kind of combination, which they call confusion (*σύγχυσις*), illustrated by the example of the tetrapharmacon, which consists of wax, fat, pitch, and resin. The resultant in a confusion is something new, which is not resolvable into its constituent parts.

But then Aristotle describes a combination, which is neither composition, nor mixtures, nor confusion — a combination of two things of unequal power, one of which is active and the other passive. It is illustrated by the example of the combination of a drop of wine with 10,000 gallons of water, or of tin with bronze. In this kind of combination, says Aristotle, the stronger element remains intact, whereas the weaker element is changed. It is, however, not destroyed. What survives of the weaker element is, he says, some quantity, in the case of the wine, or some quality, in the case of the tin. Aristotle uses no special term to describe this kind of combination. In fact, the Greeks have no word for it. But, on the basis of Aristotle’s statement that in this kind of combination the weaker element “changes into that which predominates (*εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν*)”,<sup>103</sup> I have coined the term “predominance,” as counterpart to the terms “composition,” “mixture,” and “confusion,” and describe this kind of combination as a “union of predominance.”<sup>104</sup> It is this Aristotelian conception of “predominance” that, I believe, is reflected in Apollinaris’ contention that in the union of the irrational soul with the Logos, the Logos retains its nature, but the irrational soul does not retain its nature; it retains only its quality or property.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. *ibid.* pp. 372 ff.

<sup>103</sup> *De Gene. et Corr.* I, 10, 328a, 26.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* I, p. 379.

That is to say, while indeed Jesus had only one nature, the divine nature, the nature of the Logos which was incarnate in him, his body still retained the property of its irrational animal soul in that it could experience the suffering common to all bodies that have animal souls. If I am right in this interpretation of Apollinaris, we have in him an answer to an objection raised by certain Fathers against his doctrine. Both Gregory of Nazianzus<sup>105</sup> and Gregory of Nyssa<sup>106</sup> argued that Apollinaris' denial of a human nature would lead to Theopaschitism, that is, to the view that God himself suffered in the crucifixion of Jesus. To this Apollinaris, I imagine, would have answered that by his denial of a human nature in Jesus he did not deny in him an animal property, and it was this animal property in him, and not the divine nature, that experienced the passion of Jesus.

Let us now sum up our conclusions.

Without going into a search for philosophic parallels of single expressions or terms in the fragments of the Arian and Apollinarian writings, we confined ourselves to the philosophical implications of the main issues in their theological systems. We have found that primarily the motive underlying the main issues was religious, but indirectly it involved certain philosophic views.

In the Arian controversy, the question whether the Logos was created *ex nihilo* after it had never been or whether it was eternally generated from the essence of God, with its resultant question whether the Logos was only divine or whether it was God, involved two philosophic problems: (1) whether to follow the Philonic interpretation of the Platonic ideas, or the interpretation of the Platonic ideas that is identified with the name of Plotinus; (2) whether God should be conceived of as an efficient cause, after the analogy of an artisan, or whether He should be conceived of also as a material cause after the analogy of a begetter.

In the Apollinarian controversy, Apollinaris' contention that Jesus had only a divine nature was due to his application of logical reasoning to what he considered to be a fundamental Christian principle, namely, that only a God could be a savior.

In both the Arian and the Apollinarian controversy, the denial by both Arius and Apollinaris of a rational soul in Jesus had also a philosophic implication. In the case of Arius, it was a logical consequence of his adoption of Philo's conception of the human mind as a copy of the Logos, coupled with his retention of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos. In the case of Apollinaris, it was, again, his application of logical reasoning to

<sup>105</sup> *Epist. 202 (PG 37, 333A).*

<sup>106</sup> *Adversus Apollinarium, Antirrheticus 5 (PG 45, 1132B).*

what he considered two fundamental Christian principles, namely, (1) the aforementioned principle that only a God could be a savior; (2) that the rational soul constitutes the human nature.

Finally, the vacillation on the part of both Arius and Apollinaris between the denial and the affirmation of an irrational soul in Jesus had its basis in the philosophic problem whether the irrational soul in man is a distinct soul second to the rational soul or whether it is an exuviation of the rational soul.

Arianism was accused by its opponents among the Fathers of being tainted with Jewish monotheism.<sup>107</sup> This is a valid accusation, for Arianism was a revival of the Philonic conception of the absolute unity of God. Arianism was also accused of being tainted with heathenish polytheism.<sup>108</sup> This accusation is valid only if aimed at those Arians who, out of regard for John's statement that "the Logos was God," named the Logos God, even though it was to them only a created being.<sup>109</sup> Arius himself, however, interpreted the statement that "the Logos was God" to mean only that it was divine.<sup>110</sup> Apollinarianism, as far as I know, was never called by its opponents either a Judaistic heresy or a heathenish heresy. There is no assurance, however, I imagine, that historians who see in every mention of the term "savior" in the New Testament the influence of pagan mysteries may not someday raise the question whether in Apollinarianism, with its insistence that only a god can be a savior, there is not the recrudescence of that old pagan influence. But this would not be a subject for historical investigation; it would be a subject for metahistorical speculation.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. Epistle of Alexander of Alexandria in Theodoret of Cyrrhus, *Eccl. Hist.* I, 3 (PG 82, 889B; PG 18, 549B).

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Athanasius, *Orat. cont. Arian.* III, 16 (PG 26, 353C).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.* I, 6 (21Df.).